As champions of the accused and haters of tyranny, we celebrate any vindication of the constitutional rights of the individual, especially when it comes from the Supreme Court. In that spirit, see Justice Kagan’s typically thoughtful opinion yesterday for a unanimous Supreme Court in Abouammo v. United States, a breeze of a read.

As Abouammo reminds us, both Article III and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee defendants the right to be tried only in jurisdictions where prosecutors charge that they “committed” the crime. The Supreme Court’s test follows from this: Venue lies generally only in the locations of the alleged acts that would satisfy the charge’s “essential conduct elements.” United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 280 (1999). So, when prosecutors get “creative” about where to file charges (as if they ever should), the question becomes, what are the conduct elements?

Fortenberry

BKLW’s recent related case involved charges of alleged knowingly false statements violating 18 U.S.C. § 1001 made in Nebraska and Washington, D.C., which the government insisted on bringing to trial in Los Angeles, on the theory the statements were material to an L.A.-based investigation. Given our client was a conservative Congressman representing Nebraska, trial in Los Angeles tended to disadvantage him significantly. The Ninth Circuit squarely rejected the government’s venue theory by holding that materiality, the statement’s capacity to influence, is not a conduct element because the offense is complete regardless of whether the statement in fact does influence the recipient. United States v. Fortenberry, 89 F.4th 702, 707 (9th Cir. 2023)

Angotti

Meanwhile, as in United States v. Angotti, charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1014, for “‘knowingly mak[ing] any false statement ... for the purpose of influencing ... the action’ of a federally insured institution,” historically were treated differently in the Ninth Circuit from the way Fortenberry treats § 1001 because § 1014 “expressly contemplates the effect of influencing the action of a financial institution.” Id. at 710 (quoting and distinguishing United States v. Angotti, 105 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1997)). Thus, in effect, the Ninth Circuit interpreted venue for § 1014 charges by looking to the alleged mens rea: “For purposes of criminal liability, it was sufficient that ‘Angotti’s statement was made for the purpose of influencing the bank official who had the power to approve his loan’” in the jurisdiction where he was tried, though that was not where he made the statement. E.g., United States v. Abouammo, 122 F.4th 1072, 1091 (9th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added), rev'd and remanded, No. 25-5146, 2026 WL 1686084 (U.S. June 11, 2026) (quoting Angotti, 105 F.3d at 543).

Abouammo

Notably, yesterday’s decision by the Supreme Court clearly takes a more restrictive approach to venue than the Ninth Circuit was deriving from Angotti. In Abouammo, the Supreme Court forbids basing venue on the location of the intended effects of acts completed elsewhere.

Abouammo was charged with falsifying a record in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which criminalizes “knowingly alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilat[ing], conceal[ing], cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false entry” in records or documents “with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence” an ongoing or contemplated federal investigation. In short summary, Abouammo was accused of sending a fake invoice from Seattle to San Francisco to deceive FBI agents investigating him there. Over Abouammo’s persistent venue objections, he was convicted by a jury in San Francisco.

Despite Fortenberry, Abouammo also lost at the Ninth Circuit. The Abouammo Ninth Circuit panel deemed § 1519 more similar, for venue purposes, to § 1014 than to § 1001 again because § 1519 “‘expressly contemplates the effect of influencing the action’” of another. Abouammo, 122 F.4th at 1092 (quoting Fortenberry, 89 F.4th at 710, and adding emphasis).

But the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that treating a “contemplated effect” as part of the actus reus was wrong:

The statute’s concern with effects is … confined to the defendant’s mens rea (or as the Ninth Circuit might put it, his “contemplat[ion]”). Section 1519 does not require that falsifying a document have any impact at all on an investigation—that it in fact obstruct or impede an investigation, present or future. (The statute thus differs from many federal laws barring actual obstruction. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).) So whatever obstructive effects Abouammo’s false invoice may have had in northern California, they were not elements of his crime. And because that is so, those effects cannot figure in determining where Abouammo’s “crime [was] committed.”

Abouammo v. United States, No. 25-5146, 2026 WL 1686084, at *5 (U.S. June 11, 2026).

Implications

Abouammo leaves no room for mens rea to extend venue, and, even in the Ninth Circuit going forward, Angotti should no longer be read to support venue based merely on the location of the intended effects of acts completed elsewhere.

If you are concerned by allegations of a false statement or obstruction-related offense, BKLW may be able to help.